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Abstract
T-310 is a cipher that was used for encryption of governmental communications in East Ger-
many during the final years of the Cold War. Due to its complexity and the encryption process,
there was no published attack for a period of more than 40 years until 2018 by Nicolas T. Cour-
tois et al. in [10]. In this thesis we study the so called ’long term keys’ that were used in the
cipher, in order to expose weaknesses which will assist the design of various attacks on T-310.
Keywords: Cold War, T-310, block cipher, Linear Cryptanalysis, Generalised Linear Crypt-
analysis, slide attacks, decryption oracle attacks
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Goal
T-310 was an extremely significant cipher as it was used for encryption of teletype communi-
cations during the Cold War in East Germany. Its production started in the 1970s and it was
designed by mathematicians and engineers who specialised in cryptography and cryptology.
After it was examined for its security by ZCO and Soviet cryptologists in 1980, a large number
of T-310 cipher machines started being massively produced, and the number of around 3800
active cipher machines being used in 1989 was reached. During the final years of the Cold War,
T-310 had become so famous that it was used for encryption of governmental communicatios
(see chapter 1 in [9]).
T-310 is a rather complex cipher and for more than 40 years no attack was published until
2018 by Nicolas T. Courtois et al. in [10]. The aim of the thesis is to study the so called
’long term keys’ which were used for a long period of time - probably for a year [4] or when it
was required [5] - in order to expose weaknesses of the cipher and exploit these weaknesses to
produce invariances which will assist the design of future attacks on T-310.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
In Chapter 2, we provide the reader with the necessary knowledge about T-310 and we explain
how encryption with T-310 was performed. In the third Chapter, we study the Boolean function
that was used inside the round function of T-310. In the next two Chapters we search for long
term keys that are weak against Linear Cryptanalysis and Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis.
These weak long term keys can then be used to deploy attacks on T-310. In the final Chapter,
we summarise our results and we suggest how the research on the design of attacks on T-310
can be extended.
Chapter 2
Background Theory
In this chapter we will repeat what has already been stated in [9].
2.1 Introduction to T-310
T-310 contains a block cipher, which is iterated many times (13 · 127 = 1651) in a stream
encryption mode in order to extract only 10 bits, and use them to encrypt a single 5-bit
character of the plaintext.
The size of the block cipher is 36 bits, the secret (short term) key has size 240 bits and the IV
has a length of 61 bits. The secret key is halved into s1−120,1 and s1−120,2 and it is repeated
every 120 rounds. In order to expand the IV bits, the designers of T-310 implemented an LFSR
(Linear-Feedback Shift Register) which has a prime period of 261 − 1 defined by:
fi = fi−61 ⊕ fi−60 ⊕ fi−59 ⊕ fi−56
Definition 2.1.1 (Long Term Key). We call a long term key a triple (D,P, α), where D :
{1, . . . , 9} → {0, . . . , 36}, P : {1, . . . , 27} → {0, . . . , 36} and α ∈ {1, . . . , 36}
There are different classes of long term keys, such as KT1 or KT2 (see Appendices A and B).
The purpose of long term keys is to make T-310 operate in a different way each time a different
long term key is used.
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Definition 2.1.2 (Round Function). We denote by um,1−36 the block cipher’s state on all 36
bits at a round m = 0, 1, 2, . . . and we set the initial state u0,1−36 = 0xC5A13E396. We denote
the round function by φ : {0, 1}3 × {0, 1}36 → {0, 1}36. Hence
um,1−36 = φ(sm,1, sm,2, fm;um−1,1−36)
As we can see from Figure 2.1, T-310 is a Feistel cipher with 4 branches, and all bits that are
numbered 1, . . . , 36 and are multiples of 4 are replaced, while those which are not multiples of
4 are just shifted to the next position. For example, bit 1 is shifted at position 2.
Figure 2.1: Internal Structure of an Encryption Round for T-310 for KT1 Keys
Definition 2.1.3 (Boolean Function Z). T-310 uses the same Boolean function Z : F62 → F2
four times in Z1,Z2,Z3 and Z4 (see Figure 2.2) and according to [15] is defined by:
Z(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x0⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ x0x3⊕ x1x2⊕ x1x4⊕ x3x4⊕ x4x5⊕ x0x2x3
⊕x0x2x5⊕ x0x3x4⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x1x3x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕ x0x1x2x3
⊕x0x1x2x4⊕ x0x1x4x5⊕ x1x2x3x5⊕ x0x1x2x3x4⊕ x0x2x3x4x5
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We can now demonstrate how the bits U1−9 are computed after one round. According to [9]
whenever D(i) = 0 we have um,0
def
= sm+1,1. By the description of KT1 keys the bits U1−9 are
computed according to the following equations:
U1 ⊕ s1 = U2 ⊕ uD(2) ⊕ uP (27) (1)
U2 ⊕ uD(2) = U3 ⊕ uD(3) ⊕ Z4(uP (21−26)) (2)
U3 ⊕ uD(3) = U4 ⊕ uD(4) ⊕ uP (20) (3)
U4 ⊕ uD(4) = U5 ⊕ uD(5) ⊕ Z3(uP (14−19))⊕ s2 (4)
U5 ⊕ uD(5) = U6 ⊕ uD(6) ⊕ uP (13) (5)
U6 ⊕ uD(6) = U7 ⊕ uD(7) ⊕ Z2(uP (7−12)) (6)
U7 ⊕ uD(7) = U8 ⊕ uD(8) ⊕ uP (6) (7)
U8 ⊕ uD(8) = U9 ⊕ uD(9) ⊕ Z1(s2, uP (1−5)) (8)
U9 ⊕ uD(9) = f (9)
Figure 2.2: Internal Structure of One Round of T-310
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2.2 Encryption in T-310
The constant α ∈ {1, . . . , 36} from the long term key defines which bit will be extracted after
every 127 rounds in order to be used for the encryption. Thus
ai
def
= u127·i,α
After the collection of 13 bits, we dispose 3 of them and use the remaining as follows:
Cj = (Pj ⊕Bj) ·M rj
where (Pj, Cj) is a 5-bit plaintext and ciphertext pair, Bj = (a7+13(j−1), . . . , a11+13(j−1)) are 5
consecutive bits out of the 13 we extracted and we use the remaining 5 consecutive bits to
compute rj as follows:
rl =

0 if Rj = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
0 if Rj = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
31− r if Rj ·M r = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
where Rj
def
= (a1+13(j−1), . . . , a5+13(j−1)) and
M =

0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

, which is such that M31 = Id
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2.3 Related Work
The structure and the encryption process of T-310 was extensively studied in [9] by the acqui-
sition of historical documents from 1970s. The long term KT1 keys and their properties were
further studied in Appendix B of [9], while in Appendix C, Nicolas T. Courtois et al. studied
the bijectivity of one round function φ, and provided a mathematical proof that all KT1 keys
induce a bijective round function. Furthermore, in [7] Nicolas T. Courtois presented a slide
attack on T-310 in combination with a decryption oracle attack.
The notion of Linear Cryptanalysis, which was introduced in [6] by Matsui in order to de-
sign an attack for DES, has served as inspiration since then for the design of many attacks,
including the attacks in section 4.3. Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis (GLC) was introduced
by Carlo Harpes et al. in [2] and it was also studied in [8]. Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis
can be used to break a Feistel cipher which is considered secure against Linear and Differential
Cryptanalysis. Since T-310 is also a Feistel cipher with 4 branches, we were inspired to use
GLC in order to find long term keys which are weak against it. Finally, we were also motivated
by [12], where the authors present attacks on Toyocrypt and LILI-128, two stream ciphers that
use LFSRs and non linear Boolean functions f , as T-310 also does, by exploiting the fact that
there exist some multivariate polynomials g such that f · g = 0.
Chapter 3
Boolean Function of T-310
It is expected that the Boolean function Z was designed in such a way that it is resistant against
linear and differential cryptanalysis, so that an attacker will not be able to correlate some input
bits with some output bits of the function. To check whether this is true, we need to calculate
the Walsh Spectrum and the Autocorrelation Spectrum of the Boolean function.
Definition 3.0.1 (Walsh Spectrum). The Walsh Spectrum of a Boolean function is defined to
be the product of the Boolean function’s truth table and the Hadamard Matrix [14, 16].
Definition 3.0.2 (Hadamard Matrix). The Hadamard Matrix (Hn) is defined to be an n × n
square matrix, where n = 2k for some k ∈ N, whose entries are only 1 or −1 and its rows are
mutually orthogonal. Hadamard Matrices are defined by the following sequence:
H1 = [1] , H2 =
1 1
1 −1
 , H2k =
H2k−1 H2k−1
H2k−1 −H2k−1
 = H2 ⊗H2k−1
for k ≥ 2, where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
Definition 3.0.3 (Autocorrelation Spectrum). The Autocorrelation Spectrum of a Boolean
function f is defined as
rˆf (x) =
∑
y∈Fn2
(−1)f(y)⊕f(y⊕x)
where x ∈ Fn2 [1, 3, 13].
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Walsh Spectrum Frequency Autocorrelation Spectrum Frequency
-10 1 -24 3
-8 2 -16 6
-6 8 -8 13
-4 5 0 20
-2 10 8 17
0 16 16 3
2 8 24 1
4 7 64 1
6 5
8 1
As we can see in both tables, most values are focused around 0 which indicates that the Boolean
function Z is resistant against linear and differential cryptanalysis.
By extending Theorem C.0.1 from [12], we have:
Theorem 3.0.1. Let f be any Boolean function f : GF (2)k → GF (2). There is a Boolean
function g 6= 0 of degree at most k such that f(x) · g(x) = (1 + a) · g(x), where a ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The number of all possible inputs to a Boolean function of degree k is 2k. For every
Boolean function f different from f = 0 or f = 1:
∃ a ∈ {0, 1}, such that |{x|f(x) = a}| ≤ 1
2
2k
Let X = {x|f(x) = a}. We then construct a matrix whose rows are the elements of X and the
columns are all possible monomials of degree at most k. Each entry of the matrix is the value
of the monomial with regard to the corresponding x ∈ X, which will result in the value 0 or 1.
Clearly, the number of columns is:
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
= 2k
We observe that the number of columns is greater than the number of rows, thus there should
be a linear combination of monomials that is equal to 0. Hence, for a Boolean function g of
degree of at most k:
∃ a ∈ {0, 1}, such that ∀x ∈ X, f(x) = a⇒ g(x) = 0
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Therefore,
∀x ∈ {0, 1}k, f(x) · g(x) = (1 + a) · g(x)
Remark 1. We can rewrite the equation in Theorem 3.0.1. as:
(f(x) + 1 + a) · g(x) = 0
Remark 2. There are 32 such g’s that satisfy the above equation for the Boolean function of
T-310. We list one for each possible degree below.
• g = x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x4⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x3⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x4⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x5⊕ x0 ∗ x4 ∗ x5⊕
x0⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x4⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x1 ∗ x2⊕ x1 ∗ x3 ∗ x5⊕ x1 ∗ x4 ∗ x5⊕
x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x3⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ 1
• g = x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3⊕ x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x4⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x4⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x5⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x4 ∗
x5 ⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x5 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ∗ x5 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x5 ⊕ x0 ⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗
x4⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x4⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x1 ∗ x2⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ 1
• g = x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3⊕ x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x4⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x5⊕ x0 ∗ x2 ∗
x5 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ∗ x5 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ⊕ x0 ∗ x3 ∗ x5 ⊕ x0 ⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5 ⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗
x4⊕ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x1 ∗ x2⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ 1
• g = x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ∗ x5
Chapter 4
Linear Cryptanalysis
In this chapter we search for weak long term keys that exhibit linear invariances. In section 4.3
we explain the significance of these keys to mount attacks on T-310.
Note: For the remaining of this chapter we let X(i) denote values inside round i.
4.1 Weak Keys with One-Bit Correlations
Theorem 4.1.1 (A class of Alpha to Alpha properties). For each long term KT1 key such that
D(6) = 28, D(7) = 36, D(8) = 20, P (4) = 30, P (5) = 22, P (8) = 18, P (10) = 34 and for
any short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the α→ α linear
approximation, [25]→ [25], for 6 rounds.
Proof. We will prove the above theorem using the long term key 625 which has the above
characteristics.
625 : P = 7, 32, 33, 30, 22, 20, 5, 18, 9, 34, 35, 31, 36, 28, 21, 24, 27, 25, 26, 16, 4, 23, 19, 29, 8, 12, 11
D = 0, 32, 24, 8, 12, 28, 36, 20, 4
We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.1: A Detailed Explanation for Key 625
rounds input → output bias
3 [25] → [28] 2−1.0
1 [28] → [19,21,29,35] 2−3.4
2 [19,21,29,35] → [25] 2−2.4
11
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Figure 4.1: One Round of T-310 for Key 625
First, we observe that [25]→ [26]→ [27]→ [28] for 3 rounds. So u(1)25 = u(3)28 .
We combine equations (6) and (7) to get
U6 = uD(6) ⊕ Z2(v7− v12)⊕ U8 ⊕ uD(8) ⊕ uP (6) (4.1)
From the description of KT1 keys we have that P (6) = D(8). This means that v6 = u
(3)
20 = uD(8)
and the XOR of two quantities that are equal is zero. Furthermore, according to the theorem
we have D(6) = 28. So equation 4.1 becomes
u
(4)
21 ⊕ u(4)29 ⊕ u(3)28 = Z(3)2 (v7− v12) (4.2)
From the theorem we observe that v8 = u
(3)
18 and v10 = u
(3)
34 which are two of the inputs of Z2.
If we add u
(3)
18 and u
(3)
34 in both sides of the equation 4.2, we have
Z
(3)
2 (v7− v12)⊕ u(3)18 ⊕ u(3)34 = u(3)28 ⊕ u(4)21 ⊕ u(4)29 ⊕ u(3)18 ⊕ u(3)34 (4.3)
We know that bits u18 and u34 in round 3 will become bits u19 and u35 in round 4, respectively.
So equation 4.3 becomes
Z
(3)
2 (v7− v12))⊕ u(3)18 ⊕ u(3)34 = u(3)28 ⊕ u(4)21 ⊕ u(4)29 ⊕ u(4)19 ⊕ u(4)35
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and the expression u
(3)
28 ⊕ u(4)21 ⊕ u(4)29 ⊕ u(4)19 ⊕ u(4)35 is biased.
Thus, we have showed that [28]→ [19, 21, 29, 35].
In the fifth round the bits u19, u21, u29, u35 become u20, u22, u30, u36. According to the theorem,
we have D(7) = 36, D(8) = 20 = P (6), P (4) = 30 and P (5) = 22. So we have v4 = u
(5)
30 ,
v5 = u
(5)
22 , v6 = u
(5)
20 and u
(5)
D(7) = u
(5)
36 .
Combining equations (7), (8) and (9) we get
U7 = uD(7) ⊕ uP (6) ⊕ Z1(s2, v1− v5)⊕ f
which becomes
u
(6)
25 = u
(5)
36 ⊕ u(5)20 ⊕ Z(5)1 (s2, v1− v5)⊕ f (5)
We observe that the output of Z
(5)
1 is correlated to the XOR of two of its inputs u
(5)
22 ⊕ u(5)30
Hence, we have
u
(6)
25 ⊕ f (5) = u(5)36 ⊕ u(5)20 ⊕ Z(5)1 (s2, v1− v5)⊕ u(5)22 ⊕ u(5)30
where the right hand side is biased.
Thus, we showed that [19, 21, 29, 35]→ [25] for 2 rounds.
Therefore, we have shown that [25] → [25] holds for 6 rounds and all the conditions of the
theorem were satisfied.
Proof produced by software1:
[25]→ [26] i25=o26
[26]→ [27] i26=o27
[27]→ [28] i27=o28
[28]→ [19, 21, 29, 35] Z2=g6⊕g5 Z2=Z2e2+Z2e4 Z2e2=i18 Z2e4=i34 v6=g7⊕g6 v6=i20
d8=g7⊕o29 d8=i20 d6=g5⊕o21 d6=i28 i18=o19 i34=o35
[19, 21, 29, 35]→ [20, 22, 30, 36] i19=o20 i21=o22 i29=o30 i35=o36
[20, 22, 30, 36]→ [25] Z1=f⊕g7 Z1=Z1e5+Z1e6 Z1e5=i30 Z1e6=i22 v6=g7⊕g6 v6=i20
d7=g6⊕o25 d7=i36
1This is a product of software written by Nicolas T. Courtois
14 Chapter 4. Linear Cryptanalysis
Another Proof for Key 729:
729 : P = 7, 23, 33, 16, 31, 4, 5, 1, 9, 12, 14, 13, 36, 8, 21, 3, 24, 25, 32, 20, 2, 6, 30, 29, 28, 26, 18
D = 0, 12, 16, 28, 8, 32, 36, 4, 24
[29]→ [30] i29=o30
[30]→ [31] i30=o31
[31]→ [32] i31=o32
[32]→ [2, 21, 29] Z2=g6⊕g5 Z2=Z2e2 Z2e2=i1 v6=g7⊕g6 v6=i4 d8=g7⊕o29 d8=i4
d6=i32 d6=g5⊕o21 i1=o2
[2, 21, 29]→ [3, 22, 30] i2=o3 i21=o22 i29=o30
[3, 22, 30]→ [4, 23, 31] i3=o4 i22=o23 i30=o31
[4, 23, 31]→ [29] Z1=f⊕g7 Z1=Z1e3+Z1e6 Z1e3=i23 Z1e6=i31 d8=g7⊕o29 d8=i4
Remark. Whenever a long term KT1 key exhibits an one-bit correlation of type [4 · k + 1] →
[4 · k + 1], where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7}, then the same key can also be used for one-bit correlations
of type [4 · k + i]→ [4 · k + i], where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Conjecture 4.1.1. From our observations, we believe that the smaller the number α is the
hardest it is to produce one-bit correlations. That is because as the number α becomes smaller,
the Hamming weight (HW) at round 4 becomes larger. For example, as you can also observe
in Appendix C, if α ∈ {29, . . . , 32}, HW = 3 at round 4 and if α ∈ {25, . . . , 29}, HW = 4 at
round 4 etc.
4.2 More Weak Keys
From the theorem below, we can see that it is possible for a long term KT1 key to exhibit an
invariant property which includes more than one bits.
Theorem 4.2.1 (A class of 8R properties). For each long term KT1 key such that {D(7), D(9)} ∈
{12, 16}, {D(3)/D(4)} = 32, with the remaining of {D(3)/D(4)} ∈ {28, 36} and finally the re-
maining of {28, 36} ∈ P (20) and for any short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial state on
36 bits, we have the linear approximation [9, 13]→ [9, 13] which is true with probability exactly
1.0 for 8 rounds.
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Proof. A long term key that has the above characteristics is key 788:
788 : P = 26, 19, 33, 36, 4, 20, 5, 27, 9, 17, 2, 11, 12, 31, 21, 22, 1, 25, 7, 28, 16, 24, 32, 29, 8, 30, 34
D = 0, 4, 36, 32, 24, 8, 12, 20, 16
We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.2: A Detailed Explanation of the 8 Round Property
rounds input → output bias
3 [9,13] → [12,16,f (3)] 2−1.0
1 [12,16,f (3)] → [25,29,33] 2−1.0
3 [25,29,33] → [28,32,36] 2−1.0
1 [28,32,36] → [9,13] 2−1.0
First, we observe that [9]→ [10]→ [11]→ [12] and [13]→ [14]→ [15]→ [16] for 3 rounds. So
u
(1)
9 = u
(3)
12 and u
(1)
13 = u
(3)
16 .
From the description of KT1 keys we have that P (6) = D(8). This means that v6 = u
(3)
20 = uD(8)
and the XOR of two quantities that are equal, is zero. So equation (7) becomes
u
(4)
21 ⊕ u(4)29 ⊕ u(4)25 = u(3)D(7)
Figure 4.2: One Round of T-310 for Key 788
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Then we have two cases:
Case A: If D(7) = 12 and D(9) = 16, then we have u
(4)
29 ⊕ u(4)25 = u(3)12 and using (9) we have
u
(4)
33 = f
(3) ⊕ u(3)16 which implies that [12]→ [25, 29] and [16, f (3)]→ [33].
Case B: If D(7) = 16 and D(9) = 12, then we have u
(4)
29 ⊕ u(4)25 = u(3)16 and using (9) we have
u
(4)
33 = f
(3) ⊕ u(3)12 which implies that [16]→ [25, 29] and [12, f (3)]→ [33].
So in both cases we have [12, 16, f (3)]→ [25, 29, 33]
Then we can easily observe that [25]→ [28], [29]→ [32] and [33]→ [36] for 3 rounds.
From equation (3), the following holds
u
(8)
9 ⊕ u(8)13 = u(7)D(3) ⊕ u(7)D(4) ⊕ u(7)P (20)
If we first have {D(3)/D(4)} = 32, with the remaining of {D(3)/D(4)} ∈ {28, 36} and finally
the remaining of {28, 36} ∈ P (20), then clearly {D(3), D(4), P (20)} ∈ {28, 32, 36}. Hence, the
following holds
u
(8)
9 ⊕ u(8)13 = u(7)28 ⊕ u(7)32 ⊕ u(7)36
Therefore, we have successfully shown that [28, 32, 36]→ [9, 13].
However, we cannot have P (20) = 32 and {D(3), D(4)} ∈ {28, 36} because the following
condition of KT1 keys will no longer hold:
”There exist {j1, j2, . . . , j7, j8} a permutation of {2, 3, . . . , 9} which defines
D(i) for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 9} as follows:
D(j1) = 4, D(j2) = 4j1, D(j3) = 4j2, . . . , D(j8) = 4j7”
However, even if we can construct KT1 keys which have linear invariances such the one we have
just studied, in order to mount an attack like the one described in section 4.3.2 we need to find
invariant properties that include both IV bits and secret key bits. As we will see in the rest of
this section this is also possible.
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Theorem 4.2.2 (A class of 6R properties). For each long term KT1 key such that D(7) = 16,
{D(3), D(4), P (20)} ⊂ {4, 8, 36}, P (27) = 10 and finally {D(2), D(9)} ⊂ {28, 32} and for any
short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the linear approximation
[1, 5, 15, 33]→ [1, 5, 15, 33] which is true with probability exactly 1.0 for 6 rounds.
Proof. A long term key that has the above characteristics is key 706:
706 : P = 8, 2, 33, 4, 13, 20, 5, 14, 9, 22, 30, 31, 16, 19, 21, 32, 3, 25, 28, 36, 27, 11, 23, 29, 12, 24, 10
D = 0, 28, 8, 4, 24, 12, 16, 20, 32
We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.3: A Detailed Explanation of the 6 Round Property
rounds input → output bias
2 [1,5,15,33] → [3,7,25,29,35] 2−1.0
2 [3,7,25,29,35] → [9,13,27,31] 2−1.0
2 [9,13,27,31] → [1,5,15,33] 2−1.0
First of all, we observe that [1]→ [3], [5]→ [7] and [33]→ [35] for 2 rounds. We also see that
[15]→ [16] for 1 round. So u(1)1 = u(3)3 , u(1)5 = u(3)7 , u(1)33 = u(3)35 and u(1)15 = u(2)16 .
Figure 4.3: Explanation for our Proof
From the description of KT1 keys we have P (6) = D(8) and from the theorem we also have
D(7) = 16. Hence, equation (7) becomes
u
(3)
25 ⊕ u(3)29 = u(2)16
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Thus, we have [16] → [25, 29] for 1 round and, therefore, [1, 5, 15, 33] → [3, 7, 25, 29, 35] for 2
rounds.
Then we observe that u
(3)
25 = u
(5)
27 , u
(3)
29 = u
(5)
31 , u
(3)
3 = u
(4)
4 , u
(3)
7 = u
(4)
8 and u
(3)
35 = u
(4)
36 . According
to the theorem, we have the condition {D(3), D(4), P (20)} ⊂ {4, 8, 36}. Therefore, equation
(3) becomes
u
(4)
4 ⊕ u(4)8 ⊕ u(4)36 = u(5)9 ⊕ u(5)13
Thus, we have shown that [3, 7, 25, 29, 35]→ [9, 13, 27, 31] for 2 rounds.
Figure 4.4: Further Explanation for our Proof
We proceed to the final part of the proof as follows:
It is clear that u
(5)
13 = u
(7)
15 , u
(5)
9 = u
(6)
10 , u
(5)
27 = u
(6)
28 , and u
(5)
31 = u
(6)
32 . The remaining conditions
from the theorem are P (27) = 10 and {D(2), D(9)} ⊂ {28, 32}. Hence, equation (1) becomes
u
(6)
10 ⊕ s(6)1 ⊕ u(6)D(2) = u(7)1 ⊕ u(7)5
and equation (9) becomes
u
(6)
D(9) ⊕ u(7)33 = f (6)
At this final step, we see that if {D(2), D(9)} ⊂ {28, 32} we have [10, 28, 32]→ [1, 5, 33] for one
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round. So, we have also shown that [9, 13, 27, 31]→ [1, 5, 15, 33] for 2 rounds.
Therefore, if the conditions of the theorem are satisfied , we have [1, 5, 15, 33] → [1, 5, 15, 33]
for 6 rounds.
Theorem 4.2.3 (A class of 4R properties). For each long term KT1 key such that D(2) = 36,
D(9) = 4, {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24} and P (27) = 7 and for any short term key on 240
bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the linear approximation [4, 8, 19 − 20, 23 −
24, 36, s
(1)
1 , f
(1)] → [4, 8, 19 − 20, 23 − 24, 36] which is true with probability exactly 1.0 for 4
rounds.
Proof. We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.4: A Detailed Explanation of the 4 Round Property
rounds input → output bias
1 [4, 8, 19− 20, 23− 24, 36, s(1)1 , f (1)]→ [1, 5, 8, 17, 20− 21, 24, 33] 2−1.0
1 [1, 5, 8, 17, 20− 21, 24, 33]→ [2, 6, 17− 18, 21− 22, 34] 2−1.0
2 [2, 6, 17− 18, 21− 22, 34]→ [4, 8, 19− 20, 23− 24, 36] 2−1.0
We observe that u
(1)
19 = u
(2)
20 and u
(1)
23 = u
(2)
24 .
According to the theorem, D(2) = 36, P (27) = 7 and using equation (1) we have
u
(2)
1 ⊕ s(1)1 = u(2)5 ⊕ u(1)36 ⊕ u(1)7
However we know that u
(1)
7 = u
(2)
8 so the previous equation becomes
u
(2)
1 ⊕ u(2)5 ⊕ u(2)8 = u(1)36 ⊕ s(1)1
Hence, [36, s
(1)
1 ]→ [1, 5, 8].
From the theorem, we also have the condition {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24}. From the
description of KT1 keys we have that P (13) = D(7) and ,thus, equation (5) becomes
u
(2)
17 ⊕ u(2)21 = u(1)8 ⊕ u(1)20 ⊕ u(1)24
Hence, [8, 20, 24]→ [17, 21].
20 Chapter 4. Linear Cryptanalysis
The last condition of the theorem is D(9) = 4 and equation (9) becomes
u
(2)
33 ⊕ u(1)4 = f (1)
Hence, [4, f (1)]→ [33].
Combining all the previous results, we have [4, 8, 19−20, 23−24, 36, s(1)1 , f (1)]→ [1, 5, 8, 17, 20−
21, 24, 33] for 1 round.
In the second round we observe that u
(2)
1 = u
(3)
2 , u
(2)
5 = u
(3)
6 , u
(2)
17 = u
(3)
18 , u
(2)
21 = u
(3)
22 , u
(2)
33 = u
(3)
34 .
Using equation (5) again we deduce that [8, 20, 24]→ [17, 21].
Thus, we have [1, 5, 8, 17, 20− 21, 24, 33]→ [2, 6, 17− 18, 21− 22, 34] for 1 round.
Finally, it is clear that [2, 6, 17− 18, 21− 22, 34]→ [4, 8, 19− 20, 23− 24, 36] for 2 rounds and
this completes the proof.
A very similar theorem is:
Theorem 4.2.4 (A class of 4R properties). For each long term KT1 key such that D(2) = 36,
D(9) = 4, {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24} and P (27) = 6 and for any short term key on 240
bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the linear approximation
[4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36, s
(1)
1 , f
(1)] → [4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36] which is true with probability exactly
1.0 for 4 rounds.
Proof. We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.5: A Detailed Explanation of the 4 Round Property
rounds input → output bias
1 [4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36, s
(1)
1 , f
(1)]→ [1, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33] 2−1.0
1 [1, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33]→ [2, 6, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 34] 2−1.0
2 [2, 6, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 34]→ [4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36] 2−1.0
We recall a subset of equations from section 2.1
U1 ⊕ s1 = U2 ⊕ uD(2) ⊕ uP (27) (1)
U5 ⊕ uD(5) = U6 ⊕ uD(6) ⊕ uP (13) (5)
U9 ⊕ uD(9) = f (9)
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We observe that u
(1)
18 = u
(2)
19 and u
(1)
22 = u
(2)
23 .
According to the theorem, D(2) = 36, P (27) = 6 and using equation (1) we have
u
(2)
1 ⊕ s(1)1 = u(2)5 ⊕ u(1)36 ⊕ u(1)6
However we know that u
(1)
6 = u
(2)
7 so the previous equation becomes
u
(2)
1 ⊕ u(2)5 ⊕ u(2)7 = u(1)36 ⊕ s(1)1
Hence, [36, s
(1)
1 ]→ [1, 5, 7].
From the theorem, we also have {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24}. From the description of KT1
keys we have that P (13) = D(7) and ,thus, equation (5) becomes
u
(2)
17 ⊕ u(2)21 = u(1)8 ⊕ u(1)20 ⊕ u(1)24
Hence, [8, 20, 24]→ [17, 21].
The last condition of the theorem is D(9) = 4 and equation (9) becomes
u
(2)
33 ⊕ u(1)4 = f (1)
Hence, [4, f (1)]→ [33].
Combining all the previous results, we have [4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36, s
(1)
1 , f
(1)]→ [1, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33]
for 1 round.
In the second round it is clear that [1, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33]→ [2, 6, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 34].
In the following two rounds we observe that u
(3)
2 = u
(5)
4 , u
(3)
6 = u
(5)
8 , u
(3)
18 = u
(5)
20 , u
(3)
22 = u
(5)
24 ,
u
(3)
34 = u
(5)
36 .
Using equation (5) again we deduce that [8, 20, 24]→ [17, 21] for 1 round.
Furthermore, we can notice that u
(4)
17 = u
(5)
18 , u
(4)
21 = u
(5)
22 .
Thus, we have [2, 6, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 34]→ [4, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 36] for 2 rounds and this completes
the proof.
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Theorem 4.2.5 (A class of 8R properties). For each long term KT1 key such that D(2) = 36,
D(9) = 4, {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24}, P (27) = 6 and for any short term key on 240
bits, and for any initial state on 36 bits, we have the linear approximation [1, 3, 5, 17, 21] →
[1, 3, 5, 17, 21] which is true with probability exactly 1.0 for 8 rounds.
Proof. We will show that the following holds:
Table 4.6: A Detailed Explanation of the 8 Round Property
rounds input → output bias
1 [1, 3, 5, 17, 21]→ [2, 4, 6, 18, 22, f (2)] 2−1.0
2 [2, 4, 6, 18, 22, f (2)]→ [4, 8, 20, 24, 34, f (4)] 2−1.0
2 [4, 8, 20, 24, 34, f (4)]→ [18, 22, 34, 36, s(6)1 ] 2−1.0
2 [18, 22, 34, 36, s
(6)
1 ]→ [2, 6, 8, 20, 24, 36, s(8)1 ] 2−1.0
1 [2, 6, 8, 20, 24, 36, s
(8)
1 ]→ [1, 3, 5, 17, 21] 2−1.0
In order to explain the results in the above table we will use the following facts:
Fact A: It is clear that u
(i)
4k+j → u(i+1)4k+j+1 where k ∈ {0, . . . , 8} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for some rounds
i and i+ 1.
Fact B: According to the theorem, D(2) = 36, P (27) = 6 and using equation (1) we have
u
(i+1)
1 ⊕ s(i)1 = u(i+1)5 ⊕ u(i)36 ⊕ u(i)6
So we have [6, 36, s
(i)
1 ]→ [1, 5].
Fact C: However we know that u
(i)
6 = u
(i+1)
7 so the previous equation can also become
u
(i+1)
1 ⊕ u(i+1)5 ⊕ u(i+1)7 = u(i)36 ⊕ s(i)1
Hence, [36, s
(i)
1 ]→ [1, 5, 7] also holds.
Fact D: From the theorem, we also have {D(5), D(6), D(7)} ⊂ {8, 20, 24}. From the description
of KT1 keys we have that P (13) = D(7) and ,thus, equation (5) becomes
u
(i+1)
17 ⊕ u(i+1)21 = u(i)8 ⊕ u(i)20 ⊕ u(i)24
Hence, [8, 20, 24]→ [17, 21].
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Fact E: The last condition of the theorem is D(9) = 4 and equation (9) becomes
u
(i+1)
33 ⊕ u(i)4 = f (i)
Hence, [4, f (i)]→ [33].
Thus, combining some of the above facts in each round, we can prove that [1, 3, 5, 17, 21] →
[1, 3, 5, 17, 21] holds for 8 rounds.
4.3 Slide Attacks on T-310
In this section, we perform two slide attacks on T-310, described in [7,11], which are based on
the three assumptions below:
1. The attacker using a decryption oracle attack, described in chapter 3 of [7], obtains access
to 73% of the values ai
def
= u127·i,α, where i = 1, 2, 3, · · ·.
2. We recall that the key bits are repeated every 120 rounds. The attacker chooses an IV at
random and creates several other IV’s which differ by clocking the IV LFSR backwards
by 120 · s steps, for some integer s.
3. The attacker is able to identify whether the internal states are identical,
i.e. u0,1−36 = u
′
120·s,1−36 = 0xC5A13E396.
We take into account the equation below for the following two attacks:
120 · s = 127 · t+ d
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4.3.1 One Bit Correlation Attack
The main purpose of the attacker is to be able to identify whether u0,1−36 = u
′
120·s,1−36 =
0xC5A13E396, by using a decryption oracle attack. For example, if s = 19, t = 18, d = −6 and
the bit α ∈ {25, 26, 27, 28}, then we can use the long term key 625, to identify if this is the case,
since there are correlations between the bits α for 6 rounds. We can also use a simpler case
when s = 1, t = 1, d = −7, in order to mount such an attack, by constructing keys according
to the preconditions mentioned in Appendix C.
More details on the attack can be found in [7].
4.3.2 Attack based on Multiple Bits Invariant Property
A most recent attack proposed in [11] is based on linear invariant properties that involve some
IV and key bits.
The attack proceeds as follows:
Based on the above assumptions, we let s = 127, t = 120 and d = 0 and we choose our ci-
phertexts that are produced with IV to have 5 characters length and those produced with IV’,
which differ by clocking the IV LFSR backwards by 120 · 127 steps, to have 1205 characters
length. We chose this specific length for our ciphertexts such that after the 120 · 127 steps, the
5 · 13 = 65 bits ua·i produced for the encryption of at least 5 characters have an overlap on the
secret key bits and IV bits.
As mentioned in the assumptions above, we obtain access to 73% of the bits ua·i. So for two
encryptions that used IV and IV’, respectively, we will obtain access to 0.73 · 0.73 · 65 ≈ 35
values ua·i and u
′
a·i at the same positions i.
Then we can conclude that the two states are identical, i.e. u0,1−36 = u
′
120·127,1−36 = 0xC5A13E396,
if all 35 bits ua·i and 35 bits u
′
a·i at the same positions i are exactly the same.
In the final step of our attack, we exploit this fact and the fact that the long term key, for
example a key that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.6, has a linear property for 8 rounds
that involves IV and key bits (in our case s1) to construct 8 parity equations and, thus, recover
8 bits of the secret key.
Chapter 5
Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis
In this chapter we use Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis in order to search for invariant, not
linear, properties of long term keys that hold for one round, a technique that was used in [8]
to formulate an attack on DES. When searching for non linear invariant properties we face a
three dimensional problem. The three dimensions are (a) the choice of a long term key, (b) the
choice of a random Boolean function and (c) the choice of the non linear invariant property.
So, we can pick two of the three dimensions and search for the answer in the third dimension.
In this chapter, we search for the non linear invariant properties occuring due to our choice of
the long term key and the choice of a random Boolean function.
Figure 5.1: Three Dimensional Problem
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5.1 Procedure of Finding Invariants on 12 Bits
As a first step to our research, we searched for invariants on 12 bits, on any long term key, and
more precisely on the bits u25 up to u36. So, the area we focused on is displayed in the figure
below.
Figure 5.2: Area of Interest for 12 Bit Invariants
By following a brute force approach in order to search for invariants on the 12 bits mentioned
above, we produced some scripts (see Appendix E.2) to help us follow these 3 steps:
Step 1: By renaming each bit ui, where i ∈ {25, 26, . . . , 36}, by the letters {l, k, j, . . . , b, a},
the IV bit, the s2 bit and the Boolean function Z1 by the letters ’F ’, ’L’ and ’Z’, respectively,
and based on the long term key, we produced a file which contains two columns of data. In the
first column, there are all possible monomials on the 12 bits. In the second column, there are
the resulting polynomials for each possible monomial after one round.
Step 2: In all resulting polynomials, we substituted F by 0 or 1.
Step 3: We XORed (exclusive or) each possible monomial with the corresponding polynomial
that was produced after one round and computed the kernel of the resulting matrix which will
produce the invariant space on the 12 bits.
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5.2 Invaribants on 12 Bits
Below we demonstrate some of the most significant results we have found.
Theorem 5.2.1 (Invariants for D(9) = 36). Following the steps mentioned in Section 4.1 and
by setting F = 0 for keys with D(9) = 36 we observe the following five invariants for one round:
• a⊕ b⊕ c⊕ d→ a⊕ b⊕ c⊕ d
• ac⊕ bd→ ac⊕ bd
• ab⊕ ad⊕ bc⊕ cd→ ab⊕ ad⊕ bc⊕ cd
• abc⊕ abd⊕ acd⊕ bcd→ abc⊕ abd⊕ acd⊕ bcd
• abcd→ abcd
Proof. We have d = u33, c = u34, b = u35, a = u36
We observe that [d]→ [c], [c]→ [b] and [b]→ [a] for one round.
From equation (9) the following holds:
a = F ⊕ d
So, if F = 0 then we have [a]→ [d] in the next round.
Then it can be easily verified that the above equations will hold for the next round.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Invariants forD(9) = 36 and L = 0 or 1). By following Theorem 4.1, replacing
Z by the original Boolean function of T-310 and using the long term key with
D = 1, 13, 3, 2, 11, 12, 32, 28, 36 and
P = 35, 27, 26, 34, 31, 29, 25, 14, 7, 22, 15, 33, 8, 30, 6, 10, 23, 4, 24, 18, 9, 20, 17, 19, 16, 5, 21
we observe that the invariant space has dimension 25 when L = 0 and dimension 32 when
L = 1.
Proof. We omit the proof because of the extensive length of the invariants.
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Theorem 5.2.3 (Invariants for D(9) = 36 and L = 1). When modifying Theorem 4.2, by
replacing Z with a Boolean function we generated at random we observe that the invariant
space has dimension 51 when L = 1.
Proof. We again omit the proof because of the extensive length of the invariants.
However, some of the invariants are listed in Appendix D. The Boolean function we used in
order to observe this large number of invariants is:
Z(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1⊕ x0x1⊕ x0x3⊕ x2x5⊕ x3x5⊕ x4x5⊕ x0x1x2
⊕x0x2x5⊕ x0x3x4⊕ x0x3x5⊕ x0x4x5⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x1x4x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕ x0x1x3x4
⊕x0x2x4x5⊕ x0x3x4x5⊕ x1x2x3x4⊕ x1x2x3x5⊕ x1x2x4x5⊕ x1x3x4x5
⊕x0x1x2x3x4⊕ x0x1x2x3x5⊕ x0x1x3x4x5⊕ x0x2x3x4x5⊕ x1x2x3x4x5
Table 5.1: Walsh Spectrum and Autocorrelation Spectrum
Walsh Spectrum Frequency Autocorrelation Spectrum Frequency
-12 1 -32 2
-8 2 -24 5
-6 5 -16 6
-4 6 -8 10
-2 14 0 17
0 13 8 11
2 11 16 9
4 8 24 2
6 1 32 1
8 1 64 1
12 1
As we can see from the above tables, we have similar values for the Walsh and Autocorrelation
Spectrum as for the original Boolean function Z of T-310 and the frequencies are again focused
around 0 which indicates that the above Boolean function exhibits a good level of resistance
against linear and differential cryptanalysis.
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Conjecture 5.2.1 (Invariants on 12 bits for F = 0 and F = 1). We believe that invariants on
12 bits are impossible for both F = 0 and F = 1 simultaneously.
We support the conjecture by the following two examples. We claim that each of the following
invariants holds for either F = 0 or F = 1.
Example 5.2.1. The long term key with D = 1, 26, 9, 34, 4, 19, 28, 36, 32 and
P = 30, 35, 31, 25, 33, 27, 5, 22, 17, 29, 13, 20, 1, 9, 21, 3, 24, 7, 6, 28, 26, 2, 32, 23, 18, 4, 34 exhibits
the following invariant P:
P = efghijkl⊕ defghijkl⊕ cefghijkl⊕ cdefghijkl⊕ befghijkl⊕ bdefghijkl⊕ bcefghijkl⊕
bcdefghijkl⊕aefghijkl⊕adefghijkl⊕acefghijkl⊕acdefghijkl⊕abefghijkl⊕abdefghijkl⊕
abcefghijkl ⊕ abcdefghijkl
According to the long term key we have P (6) = 27 = j and we know that [j] → [i] in one
round. By using equations (7), (8) and (9) we have:
i = F ⊕ Z ⊕ l ⊕ i
e = F ⊕ d
a = F ⊕ Z ⊕ h
We compute P for the next round, we then replace Z by the boolean function of T-310 and set
F = 0. Thus, P becomes:
P = abcdefghijkl⊕ bcdefghijkl⊕ acdefghijkl⊕ abdefghijkl⊕ abcdefgijkl⊕ abcdefghijk⊕
cdefghijkl⊕ bdefghijkl⊕ bcdefgijkl⊕ bcdefghijk⊕adefghijkl⊕acdefgijkl⊕acdefghijk⊕
abdefgijkl ⊕ abdefghijk ⊕ abcdefgijk ⊕ defghijkl ⊕ cdefgijkl ⊕ cdefghijk ⊕ bdefgijkl ⊕
bdefghijk⊕bcdefgijk⊕adefgijkl⊕adefghijk⊕acdefgijk⊕abdefgijk⊕defgijkl⊕defghijk⊕
cdefgijk ⊕ bdefgijk ⊕ adefgijk ⊕ defgijk
Clearly, we can deduce from the length of the polynomial that it is not an invariant for F = 0.
However, when we set F = 1 instead of F = 0, P becomes:
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P = abcdefghijkl ⊕ bcdefghijkl ⊕ acdefghijkl ⊕ abdefghijkl ⊕ abcefghijkl ⊕ cdefghijkl ⊕
bdefghijkl ⊕ bcefghijkl ⊕ adefghijkl ⊕ acefghijkl ⊕ abefghijkl ⊕ defghijkl ⊕ cefghijkl ⊕
befghijkl ⊕ aefghijkl ⊕ efghijkl
Thus, the invariant holds only for F = 1.
Example 5.2.2. The long term key with D = 0, 30, 26, 6, 7, 1, 28, 36, 32 and
P = 26, 30, 29, 31, 27, 36, 5, 18, 9, 15, 10, 19, 28, 13, 21, 32, 17, 25, 14, 7, 11, 3, 20, 35, 34, 33, 2 exhibits
the following invariant P:
P = abcdijkl ⊕ abcdhijkl ⊕ abcdgijkl ⊕ abcdghijkl ⊕ abcdfijkl ⊕ abcdfhijkl ⊕ abcdfgijkl ⊕
abcdfghijkl⊕ abcdeijkl⊕ abcdehijkl⊕ abcdegijkl⊕ abcdeghijkl⊕ abcdefijkl⊕ abcdefhijkl⊕
abcdefgijkl ⊕ abcdefghijkl
According to the equations (7), (8) and (9) and the long term key in which D(7) = 28,
D(8) = P (6) = 36, D(9) = 32, we have:
i = l ⊕ h
e = F ⊕ d
d = F ⊕ Z ⊕ h
We compute P for the next round, we then replace Z by the boolean function of T-310 and set
F = 0. Thus, P becomes:
P = abcdefghijkl ⊕ abcefghijkl ⊕ abcdfghijkl ⊕ abcdeghijkl ⊕ abcdefhijkl ⊕ abcdefghijk ⊕
abcfghijkl⊕ abceghijkl⊕ abcefhijkl⊕ abcefghijk⊕ abcdghijkl⊕ abcdfhijkl⊕ abcdfghijk⊕
abcdehijkl ⊕ abcdeghijk ⊕ abcdefhijk ⊕ abcghijkl ⊕ abcfhijkl ⊕ abcfghijk ⊕ abcehijkl ⊕
abceghijk⊕abcefhijk⊕abcdhijkl⊕abcdghijk⊕abcdfhijk⊕abcdehijk⊕abchijkl⊕abcghijk⊕
abcfhijk ⊕ abcehijk ⊕ abcdhijk ⊕ abchijk
We can easily deduce that it is not an invariant for F = 0 since the length of the resulting
polynomial is bigger than expected.
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However, when we set F = 1 instead of F = 0, P becomes:
P = abcdefghijkl ⊕ abcdfghijkl ⊕ abcdeghijkl ⊕ abcdefhijkl ⊕ abcdefgijkl ⊕ abcdghijkl ⊕
abcdfhijkl ⊕ abcdfgijkl ⊕ abcdehijkl ⊕ abcdegijkl ⊕ abcdefijkl ⊕ abcdhijkl ⊕ abcdgijkl ⊕
abcdfijkl ⊕ abcdeijkl ⊕ abcdijkl
Therefore, the invariant holds only for F = 1.
5.3 Invariants on 20 Bits
In this section, we rename each bit ui, where i ∈ {17, 18, . . . , 36}, by the letters {t, s, r, . . . , b, a},
the IV bit, the s2 bit and the Boolean functions Z1, Z2 by the letters ’F ’, ’L’, ’Z’ and ’Y ’,
respectively.
Figure 5.3: Area of Interest for 20 Bit Invariants
Theorem 5.3.1 (Toy example of invariant on 20 bits). For the Boolean function
Z(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ∗ x5 and the long term key with
D = 17, 25, 26, 35, 18, 34, 30, 32, 28 and
P = 27, 29, 31, 21, 33, 19, 26, 25, 22, 32, 23, 17, 24, 16, 18, 9, 5, 10, 35, 13, 36, 30, 34, 11, 2, 28, 14
we have the invariant P = h⊕ g⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg for F = 0 and the invariant
R = g ⊕ f ⊕ gh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ ef for F = 1.
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Proof. We have p = u21, o = u22, j = u27, i = u28, h = u29, g = u30, f = u31, e = u32 d = u33,
c = u34
We observe that [p]→ [o], [j]→ [i], [h]→ [g], [g]→ [f ], [f ]→ [e] and [d]→ [c] for one round.
From the combination of equations (8) and (9) the following holds:
e = F ⊕ Z ⊕ h
According to the theorem, we have P (1 − 5) = {27, 29, 31, 21, 33}, hence Z = j ∗ h ∗ f ∗ p ∗ d
which becomes Z = i ∗ f ∗ e ∗ o ∗ c in the next round.
We have that P = h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ fgh⊕ e ∗ (1⊕ gh⊕ fh⊕ fg).
In the next round we have:
P = g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ efg ⊕ (F ⊕ Z ⊕ h) ∗ (1⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef)
Then, if we set F = 0 and replace Z by the expression i ∗ f ∗ e ∗ o ∗ c we get back
P = h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg
as expected.
Similarly, we have that R = g ⊕ f ⊕ gh⊕ fg ⊕ e ∗ (h⊕ f) which results in
R = f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ oef ⊕ (F ⊕ Z ⊕ h) ∗ (g ⊕ e)
in the next round and if we set F = 1 and replace Z by the expression i ∗ f ∗ e ∗ o ∗ c we get
back
R = g ⊕ f ⊕ gh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ ef
as expected.
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Theorem 5.3.2 (Invariant for D(8) = 32). For the Boolean function of T-310, if F = 0, L = 0
and for the long term key with D = 0, 12, 16, 4, 36, 28, 20, 32, 24 and
P = 22, 29, 18, 31, 30, 32, 35, 27, 34, 28, 33, 26, 20, 24, 21, 17, 13, 25, 27, 8, 19, 36, 23, 16, 4, 15, 14
we have the invariant
P = h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ gh⊕ fh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg ⊕ efgh.
Proof. We observe that [h]→ [g], [g]→ [f ], [f ]→ [e] for one round.
According to the theorem, D(8) = e and from the combination of equations (8) and (9) we
have:
e = F ⊕ Z ⊕ h
Hence, in the next round P becomes:
P = g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg ⊕ (F ⊕ Z ⊕ h) ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)
If we set F = 0 then we have:
P = h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ gh⊕ fh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg ⊕ efgh⊕ Z ∗ (1⊕
g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)
Now we exploit the fact that for the Boolean function of T-310 when L = 0:
Z ∗ (1⊕ x2⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4⊕ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5) = 0 (5.1)
According to the theorem P (2) = x2 = h, P (4) = x4 = f and P (5) = x5 = g which will
become g, e and f in the next round, respectively. Hence, we have:
Z ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg) = 0
Therefore, in the next round we have:
P = h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ gh⊕ fh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg ⊕ efgh
and P is an invariant for the above key, if F = 0 and L = 0.
Remark. The above theorem will also be true whenever {29, 30, 31} ⊂ {P (2), P (4), P (5)}
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Now we will use equation (5.1) again in order to expand Theorem 5.3.2 to hold for both L = 0
and L = 1.
Theorem 5.3.3 (Invariant for both L = 0 and L = 1). For the Boolean function of T-310 and
the long term key with D = 0, 4, 8, 12, 24, 20, 28, 36, 32 and
P = 18, 29, 26, 31, 30, 36, 35, 19, 21, 23, 24, 34, 33, 15, 32, 14, 12, 3, 20, 16, 4, 2, 13, 11, 1, 12, 10
if F = 1, we have the invariant P = abcdijkl ∗ (1⊕ h⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ gh⊕ fh⊕ eh⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕
ef ⊕ fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg ⊕ efgh).
Proof. We observe that D(7) = i, D(8) = P (6) = a, D(9) = e. Thus, from equations (7), (9)
and the combination of equations (8) and (9) we have:
i = l ⊕ h
e = F ⊕ d
a = F ⊕ Z ⊕ h
If we let x = abcdijkl, then in the next round x will become:
x = abcijk ∗ (l ⊕ h) ∗ (F ⊕ Z ⊕ h)
and if we let y = 1⊕h⊕g⊕f⊕e⊕gh⊕fh⊕eh⊕fg⊕eg⊕ef⊕fgh⊕egh⊕efh⊕efg⊕efgh,
then in the next round y will become:
y = 1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg ⊕ (F ⊕ d) ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)
If we set F = 1, then x and y become:
x = abcijkl ∗ (1⊕ h)⊕ Zabcijk ∗ (l ⊕ h)
y = d ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)
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Clearly, P = x ∗ y. So in the next round P becomes:
P = abcdijkl ∗ (1⊕ h) ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)⊕ Zabcdijk ∗ (l ⊕ h) ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕
f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg)
Now, we will exploit two facts. As mentioned in Theorem 5.3.2, when L = 0:
Z ∗ (1⊕ x2⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4⊕ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5) = 0
Furthermore, when L = 1:
Z ∗ (1⊕ x2⊕ x4⊕ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4⊕ x2 ∗ x5⊕ x4 ∗ x5⊕ x2 ∗ x4 ∗ x5) ∗ x3 = 0
According to the theorem P (2) = x2 = h, P (3) = x3 = k, P (4) = x4 = f and P (5) = x5 = g
which will become g, j, e and f in the next round, respectively.
Thus, if either L = 0 or L = 1, we have:
Zabcdijk ∗ (l ⊕ h) ∗ (1⊕ g ⊕ f ⊕ e⊕ fg ⊕ eg ⊕ ef ⊕ efg) = 0
Hence, in either case P is simplified into
P = abcdijkl ∗ (1⊕h⊕g⊕f ⊕ e⊕gh⊕fh⊕ eh⊕fg⊕ eg⊕ ef ⊕fgh⊕ egh⊕ efh⊕ efg⊕ efgh)
and, thus, it is an invariant for both L = 0 and L = 1.
Remark. The above theorem is also true whenever P (3) ∈ {25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35}
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Further Work
T-310 contains a block cipher in a stream cipher mode and only 10 bits are used from a total of
1651 rounds to just encrypt a single character. Approximately 3% of long term KT1 keys are
weak against Linear Cryptanalysis (see Section 21.20 in [9]). In our thesis, we have explained
how a KT1 key can exhibit one bit correlations or other linear invariances for more than one bit,
and demonstrated how these invariances can be exploited. From our observations, we concluded
that it is not possible to extend the attack in section 4.3.2 in order to break the whole cipher
and we moved on to Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis. Based on our results, we realised that
a long term key can exhibit a large number of non linear invariances which hold for one round
and thus help us recover a larger proportion of the secret key bits. We have also combined a
property of Boolean functions (see Theorem 3.0.1) to generate non linear invariances.
We believe that in our ongoing research we will be able to find KT1 keys which will be weak
against Generalised Linear Cryptanalysis. Based on our findings, we are also confident that in
the near future attacks can be developed to expoit long term keys which are weak against Gen-
eralised Linear Cryptanalysis, and it is expected that these attacks will have more devastating
effects on the security of T-310.
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Appendix A
Description of KT1 Keys
Below is a description of the KT1 class of long term keys found in [94].
(P,D, α) ∈ KT1⇔ all of the following hold:
• D and P are injective
• P (3) = 33, P (7) = 5, P (9) = 9, P (15) = 21, P (18) = 25, P (24) = 29
• Let W = {5, 9, 21, 25, 29, 33}
• ∀1≥i≥9 D(i) /∈ W
• α /∈ W (note: cf. also Fig. 9.16 page 30)
• Let T = ({0, 1, . . . , 12}\W ) ∩ ({P (1), P (2), . . . , P (24)} ∪ {D(4), D(5), . . . , D(9)} ∪ {α})
• Let U = ({13, . . . , 36}\W ) ∩ ({P (26), P (27)} ∪ {D(1), D(2), D(3)})
• |T\{P (25)}| + |U\{P (25)}|≤ 12
• D(1) = 0
• There exist {j1, j2, . . . , j7, j8} a permutation of {2, 3, . . . , 9} which defines
D(i) for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 9} as follows:
D (j1) = 4, D (j2) = 4j1, D (j3) = 4j2, . . . , D (j8) = 4j7
• P (20) = 4j8 (note: this value is not any of the D(i))
• (D(5), D(6)) ∈ {8, 12, 16} × {20, 28, 32} ∪ {24, 28, 32} × {8, 12, 16}
• P (6) = D(8), P (13) = D(7)
• P (27) 6= 0 mod 4
• ∀1≥l≥9∃1≥i≥26P (i) = 4 · l
• D(3) ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• D(4) /∈ {P (14), P (16), P (17), P (19)}
• {P (8), P (10), P (11), P (12)} ∩ {D(4), D(5), D(6)} = ∅
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Description of KT2 Keys
Below is a description of the KT1 class of long term keys found in [94].
(P,D, α) ∈ KT2⇔ all of the following hold:
• D and P are injective
• P (3) = 33, P (7) = 5, P (9) = 9, P (15) = 21, P (18) = 25, P (24) = 29
• Let W = {5, 9, 21, 25, 29, 33}
• ∀1≥i≥9 D(i) /∈ W
• α /∈ W
• Let T = ({0, 1, . . . , 12}\W ) ∩ ({P (1), P (2), . . . , P (24)} ∪ {D(4), D(5), . . . , D(9)} ∪ {α})
• Let U = ({13, . . . , 36}\W ) ∩ ({P (26), P (27)} ∪ {D(1), D(2), D(3)})
• |T\{P (25)}|+|U\{P (25)}| ≤ 12
• A = {D(1), D(2), D(3), D(4), D(5), D(6), D(7), D(8), D(9)}∪{P (6), P (13), P (20), P (27)}
• A1 = {D(1), D(2)} ∪ {P (27)}
• A2 = {D(3), D(4)} ∪ {P (20)}
• A3 = {D(5), D(6)} ∪ {P (13)}
• A4 = {D(7), D(8)} ∪ {P (6)}
• ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , 27} × {1, . . . , 9} : Pi 6= Dj
• ∃j1 ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : Dj1 = 0
• {D(8), D(9)} ⊂ {4, 8, . . . , 36} ⊂ A
• ∀(i, j) ∈ 1, 27× 1, 9 : Pi 6= Dj
• ∃j1 ∈ 1, 7 : Dj1 = 0
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• {D8, D9} ⊂ {4, 8, . . . , 36} ⊂ A
• ∃ (j2, j3) ∈ ({j ∈ 1, 4|Dj1 /∈ Aj})2∧
• ∃ (j4, j5) ∈
(
1, 4\{j1, 2j2 − 1, 2j2}
)× (5, 8\{j1, 2j2 − 1, 2j2})∧
• ∃j6 ∈ 1, 9\{j1, 2j2 − 1, 2j2, j4, j5}
• j2 6= j3 ∧ {4j4, 4j5} ⊂ Aj2∧
• Aj2 ∩
(
4j1 − 3, 4j1 ∪ 4j6 − 3, 4j6
) 6= ∅∧
• {8j2 − 5, 8j2} ⊂ Aj3 ∧ Aj3 ∩
(
4j1 − 3, 4j1 ∪ 4j6 − 3, 4j6
) 6= ∅
• {D(9)}\(33, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (5)}\(29, 32 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(7), D(8), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (6)}\(25, 32 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(7), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (6)}\(25, 28 ∪ 33, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(6), D(7), D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (12)}\(21, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(5), D(7), D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (13)}\(17, 20 ∪ 25, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(7), D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (6)}\(25, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(5), D(6), D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (13)}\(17, 24 ∪ 29, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(5), D(6), D(7), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (13)}\(17, 28 ∪ 33, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(5), D(6), D(7), D(8), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (13)}\(17, 32 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(5), D(6), D(7), D(8), D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (13)}\(17, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(4), D(5), . . . , D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (19)}\(13, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• {D(3), D(4), . . . , D(9), P (1), P (2), . . . , P (20)}\(9, 36 ∪ {0}) 6= ∅
• the ”Matrix rank = 9 condition” which is defined as:
The concrete values D(i)/P (j) inside the formulas D (s1, uI1)⊕T (f, s2,P (uI1−4))
which define the 9 ”fresh” outputs I4 = {1, 5, . . . , 33} of φ appear at such places
that all the 9 ”fresh” outputs I4 of φ are sums of non-linear parts of type Z(.),
plus affine parts which involve various variables in uI2−4 , plus an invertible linear
transformation B of rank 9 with the remaining 9 inputs of I1 = {4, 8, . . . , 36}.
Appendix C
One-Bit Correlations for 7 Rounds
Using a similar method as in Theorem 4.2.2 we produced the pre-conditions needed for one-bit
correlations for 7 rounds with Hamming Weight=3,4 in the fourth round for any KT1 key.
Case 1a: [29]→ [29] using the boolean functions Z2 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(6) = 32
• {23, 31} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
• D(8)− 3 ∈ {P (7)− P (12)}
D(8) internal set of 3 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 [2, 21, 29] 2−14.46
8 [6, 21, 29] 2−11.76
12 [10, 21, 29] 2−11.76
16 [14, 21, 29] 2−14.46
20 [18, 21, 29] 2−14.46
Table C.1: Enumeration of All Cases for D(8)
Case 1b: [29]→ [29] using the boolean functions Z2 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(5) = 32
• {19, 27} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
• D(8)− 3 ∈ {P (7)− P (12)}
D(8) internal set of 3 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 [2, 17, 25] 2−14.46
8 [6, 17, 25] 2−11.76
12 [10, 17, 25] 2−11.76
16 [14, 17, 25] 2−14.46
20 [17, 18, 25] 2−14.46
Table C.2: Enumeration of All Cases for D(8)
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Case 2: [29]→ [29] using the boolean functions Z3 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(4) = 32
• D(5) ∈ {P (14), P (16), P (17), P (19)}
• {15, 19} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 16, 20, 24, 28}
• D(8)− 3 ∈ {P (14)− P (19)}
D(8) internal set of 3 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 [2, 13, 17] 2−16.94
16 [13, 14, 17] 2−16.94
20 [13, 17, 18] 2−16.94
24 [13, 17, 22] 2−13.88
28 [13, 17, 26] 2−13.88
Table C.3: Enumeration of All Cases for D(8)
Case 3: [29]→ [29] using the boolean functions Z4 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(3) = 32
• D(2) ∈ {P (21), P (22), P (23), P (25), P (26)}
• {7, 11} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 16, 20}
• D(8)−3 ∈ {P (21), P (22), P (23), P (25), P (26)}
D(8) internal set of 3 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 [2, 5, 9] 2−16.58
16 [5, 9, 14] 2−16.58
20 [5, 9, 18] 2−16.58
Table C.4: Enumeration of All Cases for D(8)
Case 4a: [25]→ [25] using the boolean functions Z2 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(6) = 28
• {23, 31} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• {D(7), D(8)} ∈ {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
• {D(7)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (7)− P (12)}
D(7) D(8) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 ↔ 8 [2, 6, 21, 29] 2−16.01
4 ↔ 12 [2, 10, 21, 29] 2−16.01
4 ↔ 16 [2, 14, 21, 29] 2−19.01
4 ↔ 20 [2, 18, 21, 29] 2−19.01
8 ↔ 12 [6, 10, 21, 29] 2−13.36
8 ↔ 16 [6, 14, 21, 29] 2−16.01
8 ↔ 20 [6, 18, 21, 29] 2−16.01
12 ↔ 16 [10, 14, 21, 29] 2−16.01
12 ↔ 20 [10, 18, 21, 29] 2−16.01
16 ↔ 20 [16, 18, 21, 29] 2−19.01
Table C.5: Enumeration of All Cases for D(7) and D(8)
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Case 4b: [25]→ [25] using the boolean functions Z2 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(5) = 28
• {19, 27} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• {D(7), D(8)} ∈ {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
• {D(7)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (7)− P (12)}
D(7) D(8) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 ↔ 8 [2, 6, 17, 25] 2−16.01
4 ↔ 12 [2, 10, 17, 25] 2−16.01
4 ↔ 16 [2, 14, 17, 25] 2−19.01
4 ↔ 20 [2, 17, 18, 25] 2−19.01
8 ↔ 12 [6, 10, 17, 25] 2−13.36
8 ↔ 16 [6, 14, 17, 25] 2−16.01
8 ↔ 20 [6, 17, 18, 25] 2−16.01
12 ↔ 16 [10, 14, 17, 25] 2−16.01
12 ↔ 20 [10, 17, 18, 25] 2−16.01
16 ↔ 20 [14, 17, 18, 25] 2−19.01
Table C.6: Enumeration of All Cases for D(7) and D(8)
Case 5: [25]→ [25] using the boolean functions Z3 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(4) = 28
• D(5) ∈ {P (14), P (16), P (17), P (19)}
• {15, 19} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• {D(7), D(8)} ∈ {4, 16, 20, 24}
• {D(7)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (14)−P (19)}
D(7) D(8) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 ↔ 16 [2, 13, 14, 17] 2−22.00
4 ↔ 20 [2, 13, 17, 18] 2−22.00
4 ↔ 24 [2, 13, 17, 22] 2−18.48
16 ↔ 20 [13, 14, 17, 18] 2−22.00
16 ↔ 24 [13, 14, 17, 22] 2−18.48
20 ↔ 24 [13, 17, 18, 22] 2−18.48
Table C.7: Enumeration of All Cases for D(7) and D(8)
Case 6: [25]→ [25] using the boolean functions Z4 and Z1
Pre-conditions:
• D(3) = 28
• D(2) ∈ {P (21), P (22), P (23), P (25), P (26)}
• {7, 11} ∈ {P (1), P (2), P (4), P (5)}
• {D(7), D(8)} ∈ {4, 16, 20, 32}
• {D(7)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (21)−P (26)}
D(7) D(8) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 ↔ 16 [2, 5, 9, 14] 2−21.07
4 ↔ 20 [2, 5, 9, 18] 2−21.07
32 4 [2, 5, 9, 30] 2−19.34
16 ↔ 20 [5, 9, 14, 18] 2−21.07
32 16 [5, 9, 14, 30] 2−19.34
32 20 [5, 9, 18, 30] 2−19.34
Table C.8: Enumeration of All Cases for D(7) and D(8)
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Case 7: [21]→ [21] using the boolean functions Z2 and Z1/Z2
Pre-conditions:
• D(5) = 24
• {19, 27} ∈ {P (1)− P (12)}
• D(6) ∈ {8, 12, 16}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
• {D(6)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (7)− P (12)}
D(8) D(6) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 8 [2, 6, 17, 25] 2−15.63
4 12 [2, 10, 17, 25] 2−15.63
4 16 [2, 14, 17, 25] 2−19.12
8 ↔ 12 [6, 10, 17, 25] 2−11.55
8 ↔ 16 [6, 14, 17, 25] 2−14.61
20 8 [6, 17, 18, 25] 2−14.61
12 ↔ 16 [10, 14, 17, 25] 2−15.63
20 12 [10, 17, 18, 25] 2−19.12
20 16 [14, 17, 18, 25] 2−15.63
Table C.9: Enumeration of All Cases for D(6) and D(8)
Case 8: [21]→ [21] using the boolean functions Z3 and Z1/Z2
Pre-conditions:
• D(4) = 24
• D(5) ∈ {P (14), P (16), P (17), P (19)}
• {15, 19} ∈ {P (1)− P (12)}
• D(6) ∈ {16, 20, 28}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 16, 20, 28}
• {D(6)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (14)−P (19)}
D(8) D(6) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 16 [2, 13, 14, 17] 2−19.21
4 20 [2, 13, 17, 18] 2−19.21
4 28 [2, 13, 17, 26] 2−15.63
16 ↔ 20 [13, 14, 17, 18] 2−18.20
16 ↔ 28 [13, 14, 17, 26] 2−14.61
20 ↔ 28 [13, 17, 18, 26] 2−14.61
Table C.10: Enumeration of All Cases for D(6) and D(8)
Case 9: [21]→ [21] using the boolean functions Z4 and Z1/Z2
Pre-conditions:
• D(3) = 24
• D(2) ∈ {P (21), P (22), P (23), P (25), P (26)}
• {7, 11} ∈ {P (1)− P (12)}
• D(6) ∈ {16, 20, 32}
• D(8) ∈ {4, 16, 20, 32}
• {D(6)− 3, D(8)− 3} ∈ {P (21)−P (26)}
D(8) D(6) internal set of 4 bits after 4 rounds proportion of weak keys
4 16 [2, 5, 9, 14] 2−19.59
4 20 [2, 5, 9, 18] 2−19.59
4 32 [2, 5, 9, 30] 2−16.59
16 ↔ 20 [5, 9, 14, 18] 2−18.58
16 ↔ 32 [5, 9, 14, 30] 2−15.58
20 ↔ 32 [5, 9, 18, 30] 2−15.58
Table C.11: Enumeration of All Cases for D(6) and D(8)
Appendix D
Invariants on 12 Bits
When using the Boolean function mentioned in Theorem 5.2.3 with L = 1 and the long term
key with D = 1, 13, 3, 2, 11, 12, 32, 28, 36 and
P = 35, 27, 26, 34, 31, 29, 25, 14, 7, 22, 15, 33, 8, 30, 6, 10, 23, 4, 24, 18, 9, 20, 17, 19, 16, 5, 21
we observed that the invariant space has dimension 51. We list some of the invariants below.
1. d+ c+ b+ a
2. bd+ ac
3. cd+ bc+ ad+ ab
4. bcd+ acd+ abd+ abc
5. abcd
6. j + i+ h+ gl+ gj + fk+ fi+ eh+ dj + di+ dh+ cj + ci+ ch+ bj + bi+ bh+ aj + ai+ ah+ dgl+ dgj +
dfk+ dfi+ deh+ cgl+ cgj+ cfk+ cfi+ ceh+ cdj+ cdi+ cdh+ bgl+ bgj+ bfk+ bfi+ beh+ bdj+ bdi+
bdh+ bcj+ bci+ bch+agl+agj+afk+afi+aeh+adj+adi+adh+acj+aci+ach+abj+abi+abh+
cdgl+ cdgj + cdfk+ cdfi+ cdeh+ bdgl+ bdgj + bdfk+ bdfi+ bdeh+ bcgl+ bcgj + bcfk+ bcfi+ bceh+
bcdj+ bcdi+ bcdh+ adgl+ adgj+ adfk+ adfi+ adeh+ acgl+ acgj+ acfk+ acfi+ aceh+ acdj+ acdi+
acdh+abgl+abgj+abfk+abfi+abeh+abdj+abdi+abdh+abcj+abci+abch+ bcdgl+ bcdgj+ bcdfk+
bcdfi+ bcdeh+ acdgl+ acdgj + acdfk+ acdfi+ acdeh+ abdgl+ abdgj + abdfk+ abdfi+ abdeh+ abcgl+
abcgj + abcfk + abcfi+ abceh+ abcdj + abcdi+ abcdh+ abcdgl + abcdgj + abcdfk + abcdfi+ abcdeh
7. jl+ ik+ ij+hj+hi+gi+gh+fl+fh+ek+eg+djl+dik+dij+dhj+dhi+dgi+dgh+dfl+dfh+dek+
deg+cjl+cik+cij+chj+chi+cgi+cgh+cfl+cfh+cek+ceg+bjl+bik+bij+bhj+bhi+bgi+bgh+bfl+
bfh+bek+beg+ajl+aik+aij+ahj+ahi+agi+agh+afl+afh+aek+aeg+cdjl+cdik+cdij+cdhj+
cdhi+cdgi+cdgh+cdfl+cdfh+cdek+cdeg+bdjl+bdik+bdij+bdhj+bdhi+bdgi+bdgh+bdfl+bdfh+
bdek+bdeg+bcjl+bcik+bcij+bchj+bchi+bcgi+bcgh+bcfl+bcfh+bcek+bceg+adjl+adik+adij+
adhj+adhi+adgi+adgh+adfl+adfh+adek+adeg+acjl+acik+acij+achj+achi+acgi+acgh+acfl+
acfh+acek+aceg+abjl+abik+abij+abhj+abhi+abgi+abgh+abfl+abfh+abek+abeg+bcdjl+bcdik+
bcdij+bcdhj+bcdhi+bcdgi+bcdgh+bcdfl+bcdfh+bcdek+bcdeg+acdjl+acdik+acdij+acdhj+acdhi+
acdgi+ acdgh+ acdfl+ acdfh+ acdek+ acdeg+ abdjl+ abdik+ abdij+ abdhj+ abdhi+ abdgi+ abdgh+
abdfl+abdfh+abdek+abdeg+abcjl+abcik+abcij+abchj+abchi+abcgi+abcgh+abcfl+abcfh+abcek+
abceg+abcdjl+abcdik+abcdij+abcdhj+abcdhi+abcdgi+abcdgh+abcdfl+abcdfh+abcdek+abcdeg
8. l+k+j+i+h+g+f+e+kl+jl+jk+il+ik+ij+hl+hk+hj+hi+gl+gk+gj+gi+gh+fl+fk+fj+fi+
fh+fg+el+ek+ej+ei+eh+eg+ef+jkl+ikl+ijl+ijk+hkl+hjl+hjk+hil+hik+hij+gkl+gjl+gjk+
gil+gik+gij+ghl+ghk+ghj+ghi+fkl+fjl+fjk+fil+fik+fij+fhl+fhk+fhj+fhi+fgl+fgk+
fgj+fgi+fgh+ekl+ejl+ejk+eil+eik+eij+ehl+ehk+ehj+ehi+egl+egk+egj+egi+egh+efl+
efk+efj+efi+efh+efg+ijkl+hjkl+hikl+hijl+hijk+gjkl+gikl+gijl+gijk+ghkl+ghjl+ghjk+
ghil+ghik+ghij+fjkl+fikl+fijl+fijk+fhkl+fhjl+fhjk+fhil+fhik+fhij+fgkl+fgjl+fgjk+
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fgil+fgik+fgij+fghl+fghk+fghj+fghi+ejkl+eikl+eijl+eijk+ehkl+ehjl+ehjk+ehil+ehik+
ehij+egkl+egjl+egjk+egil+egik+egij+eghl+eghk+eghj+eghi+efkl+efjl+efjk+efil+efik+
efij+efhl+efhk+efhj+efhi+efgl+efgk+efgj+efgi+efgh+hijkl+gijkl+ghjkl+ghikl+ghijl+
ghijk+fijkl+fhjkl+fhikl+fhijl+fhijk+fgjkl+fgikl+fgijl+fgijk+fghkl+fghjl+fghjk+
fghil+fghik+fghij+eijkl+ehjkl+ehikl+ehijl+ehijk+egjkl+egikl+egijl+egijk+eghkl+eghjl+
eghjk+ eghil+ eghik+ eghij+ efjkl+ efikl+ efijl+ efijk+ efhkl+ efhjl+ efhjk+ efhil+ efhik+
efhij+efgkl+efgjl+efgjk+efgil+efgik+efgij+efghl+efghk+efghj+efghi+ghijkl+fhijkl+
fgijkl+fghjkl+fghikl+fghijl+fghijk+ehijkl+egijkl+eghjkl+eghikl+eghijl+eghijk+efijkl+
efhjkl+efhikl+efhijl+efhijk+efgjkl+efgikl+efgijl+efgijk+efghkl+efghjl+efghjk+efghil+
efghik+efghij+fghijkl+eghijkl+efhijkl+efgijkl+efghjkl+efghikl+efghijl+efghijk+efghijkl
9. hij+ghi+fil+fhl+fhj+fgh+ejk+ehk+egk+egj+egi+ijkl+hijl+hijk+gijl+ghjl+ghik+fikl+
fijl+fhil+fhik+fhij+fgil+fghl+fghi+ejkl+eijk+ehjk+ehik+egjl+egij+eghk+eghj+eghi+
efkl+efhk+efgl+efgh+dhij+dghi+dfil+dfhl+dfhj+dfgh+dejk+dehk+degk+degj+degi+chij+
cghi+cfil+cfhl+cfhj+cfgh+cejk+cehk+cegk+cegj+cegi+bhij+bghi+bfil+bfhl+bfhj+bfgh+
bejk+behk+begk+begj+begi+ahij+aghi+afil+afhl+afhj+afgh+aejk+aehk+aegk+aegj+aegi+
dijkl+dhijl+dhijk+dgijl+dghjl+dghik+dfikl+dfijl+dfhil+dfhik+dfhij+dfgil+dfghl+dfghi+
dejkl+deijk+dehjk+dehik+degjl+degij+deghk+deghj+deghi+defkl+defhk+defgl+defgh+
cijkl+chijl+chijk+cgijl+cghjl+cghik+cfikl+cfijl+cfhil+cfhik+cfhij+cfgil+cfghl+cfghi+
cejkl+ceijk+cehjk+cehik+cegjl+cegij+ceghk+ceghj+ceghi+cefkl+cefhk+cefgl+cefgh+cdhij+
cdghi+cdfil+cdfhl+cdfhj+cdfgh+cdejk+cdehk+cdegk+cdegj+cdegi+bijkl+bhijl+bhijk+bgijl+
bghjl+bghik+bfikl+bfijl+bfhil+bfhik+bfhij+bfgil+bfghl+bfghi+bejkl+beijk+behjk+behik+
begjl+begij+beghk+beghj+beghi+befkl+befhk+befgl+befgh+bdhij+bdghi+bdfil+bdfhl+bdfhj+
bdfgh+bdejk+bdehk+bdegk+bdegj+bdegi+bchij+bcghi+bcfil+bcfhl+bcfhj+bcfgh+bcejk+bcehk+
bcegk+bcegj+bcegi+aijkl+ahijl+ahijk+agijl+aghjl+aghik+afikl+afijl+afhil+afhik+afhij+
afgil+afghl+afghi+aejkl+aeijk+aehjk+aehik+aegjl+aegij+aeghk+aeghj+aeghi+aefkl+
aefhk+aefgl+aefgh+adhij+adghi+adfil+adfhl+adfhj+adfgh+adejk+adehk+adegk+adegj+
adegi+achij+acghi+acfil+acfhl+acfhj+acfgh+acejk+acehk+acegk+acegj+acegi+abhij+
abghi+abfil+abfhl+abfhj+abfgh+abejk+abehk+abegk+abegj+abegi+cdijkl+cdhijl+cdhijk+
cdgijl+ cdghjl+ cdghik+ cdfikl+ cdfijl+ cdfhil+ cdfhik+ cdfhij+ cdfgil+ cdfghl+ cdfghi+ cdejkl+
cdeijk+cdehjk+cdehik+cdegjl+cdegij+cdeghk+cdeghj+cdeghi+cdefkl+cdefhk+cdefgl+cdefgh+
bdijkl+ bdhijl+ bdhijk+ bdgijl+ bdghjl+ bdghik+ bdfikl+ bdfijl+ bdfhil+ bdfhik+ bdfhij+ bdfgil+
bdfghl+bdfghi+bdejkl+bdeijk+bdehjk+bdehik+bdegjl+bdegij+bdeghk+bdeghj+bdeghi+bdefkl+
bdefhk+ bdefgl+ bdefgh+ bcijkl+ bchijl+ bchijk+ bcgijl+ bcghjl+ bcghik+ bcfikl+ bcfijl+ bcfhil+
bcfhik+bcfhij+bcfgil+bcfghl+bcfghi+bcejkl+bceijk+bcehjk+bcehik+bcegjl+bcegij+bceghk+
bceghj+bceghi+bcefkl+bcefhk+bcefgl+bcefgh+bcdhij+bcdghi+bcdfil+bcdfhl+bcdfhj+bcdfgh+
bcdejk+bcdehk+bcdegk+bcdegj+bcdegi+adijkl+adhijl+adhijk+adgijl+adghjl+adghik+adfikl+
adfijl+adfhil+adfhik+adfhij+adfgil+adfghl+adfghi+adejkl+adeijk+adehjk+adehik+adegjl+
adegij+adeghk+adeghj+adeghi+adefkl+adefhk+adefgl+adefgh+acijkl+achijl+achijk+acgijl+
acghjl+acghik+acfikl+acfijl+acfhil+acfhik+acfhij+acfgil+acfghl+acfghi+acejkl+aceijk+
acehjk+acehik+acegjl+acegij+aceghk+aceghj+aceghi+acefkl+acefhk+acefgl+acefgh+acdhij+
acdghi+acdfil+acdfhl+acdfhj+acdfgh+acdejk+acdehk+acdegk+acdegj+acdegi+abijkl+abhijl+
abhijk+abgijl+abghjl+abghik+abfikl+abfijl+abfhil+abfhik+abfhij+abfgil+abfghl+abfghi+
abejkl+abeijk+abehjk+abehik+abegjl+abegij+abeghk+abeghj+abeghi+abefkl+abefhk+abefgl+
abefgh+abdhij+abdghi+abdfil+abdfhl+abdfhj+abdfgh+abdejk+abdehk+abdegk+abdegj+abdegi+
abchij+abcghi+abcfil+abcfhl+abcfhj+abcfgh+abcejk+abcehk+abcegk+abcegj+abcegi+bcdijkl+
bcdhijl+bcdhijk+bcdgijl+bcdghjl+bcdghik+bcdfikl+bcdfijl+bcdfhil+bcdfhik+bcdfhij+bcdfgil+
bcdfghl+bcdfghi+bcdejkl+bcdeijk+bcdehjk+bcdehik+bcdegjl+bcdegij+bcdeghk+bcdeghj+bcdeghi+
bcdefkl+bcdefhk+bcdefgl+bcdefgh+acdijkl+acdhijl+acdhijk+acdgijl+acdghjl+acdghik+acdfikl+
acdfijl+acdfhil+acdfhik+acdfhij+acdfgil+acdfghl+acdfghi+acdejkl+acdeijk+acdehjk+acdehik+
acdegjl+ acdegij + acdeghk+ acdeghj + acdeghi+ acdefkl+ acdefhk+ acdefgl+ acdefgh+ abdijkl+
abdhijl+abdhijk+abdgijl+abdghjl+abdghik+abdfikl+abdfijl+abdfhil+abdfhik+abdfhij+abdfgil+
abdfghl+ abdfghi+ abdejkl+ abdeijk + abdehjk + abdehik + abdegjl+ abdegij + abdeghk + abdeghj +
abdeghi+ abdefkl + abdefhk + abdefgl + abdefgh+ abcijkl + abchijl + abchijk + abcgijl + abcghjl +
abcghik+abcfikl+abcfijl+abcfhil+abcfhik+abcfhij+abcfgil+abcfghl+abcfghi+abcejkl+abceijk+
abcehjk + abcehik + abcegjl + abcegij + abceghk + abceghj + abceghi+ abcefkl + abcefhk + abcefgl +
abcefgh+ abcdhij + abcdghi+ abcdfil + abcdfhl + abcdfhj + abcdfgh+ abcdejk + abcdehk + abcdegk +
abcdegj+abcdegi+abcdijkl+abcdhijl+abcdhijk+abcdgijl+abcdghjl+abcdghik+abcdfikl+abcdfijl+
abcdfhil+abcdfhik+abcdfhij+abcdfgil+abcdfghl+abcdfghi+abcdejkl+abcdeijk+abcdehjk+abcdehik+
abcdegjl + abcdegij + abcdeghk + abcdeghj + abcdeghi+ abcdefkl + abcdefhk + abcdefgl + abcdefgh
10. jl+ik+dl+dk+dj+di+dh+dg+df+de+cl+ck+cj+ci+ch+cg+cf+ce+bl+bk+bj+bi+bh+bg+bf+
be+al+ak+aj+ai+ah+ag+af+ae+jkl+ikl+ijl+ijk+hjl+hik+gjl+gik+fjl+fik+ejl+eik+dkl+
djk+dil+dik+dij+dhl+dhk+dhj+dhi+dgl+dgk+dgj+dgi+dgh+dfl+dfk+dfj+dfi+dfh+dfg+del+
dek+dej+dei+deh+deg+def+ckl+cjl+cjk+cil+cij+chl+chk+chj+chi+cgl+cgk+cgj+cgi+cgh+
cfl+cfk+cfj+cfi+cfh+cfg+cel+cek+cej+cei+ceh+ceg+cef+bkl+bjk+bil+bik+bij+bhl+bhk+
bhj+bhi+bgl+bgk+bgj+bgi+bgh+bfl+bfk+bfj+bfi+bfh+bfg+bel+bek+bej+bei+beh+beg+bef+
akl+ajl+ajk+ail+aij+ahl+ahk+ahj+ahi+agl+agk+agj+agi+agh+afl+afk+afj+afi+afh+
afg+ael+aek+aej+aei+aeh+aeg+aef+hjkl+hikl+hijl+hijk+gjkl+gikl+gijl+gijk+ghjl+ghik+
fjkl+fikl+fijl+fijk+fhjl+fhik+fgjl+fgik+ejkl+eikl+eijl+eijk+ehjl+ehik+egjl+egik+
efjl+efik+dikl+dijk+dhkl+dhjk+dhil+dhik+dhij+dgkl+dgjk+dgil+dgik+dgij+dghl+dghk+
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dghj+dghi+dfkl+dfjk+dfil+dfik+dfij+dfhl+dfhk+dfhj+dfhi+dfgl+dfgk+dfgj+dfgi+dfgh+
dekl+dejk+deil+deik+deij+dehl+dehk+dehj+dehi+degl+degk+degj+degi+degh+defl+defk+
defj+defi+defh+defg+cjkl+cijl+chkl+chjl+chjk+chil+chij+cgkl+cgjl+cgjk+cgil+cgij+
cghl+cghk+cghj+cghi+cfkl+cfjl+cfjk+cfil+cfij+cfhl+cfhk+cfhj+cfhi+cfgl+cfgk+cfgj+
cfgi+cfgh+cekl+cejl+cejk+ceil+ceij+cehl+cehk+cehj+cehi+cegl+cegk+cegj+cegi+cegh+cefl+
cefk+cefj+cefi+cefh+cefg+bikl+bijk+bhkl+bhjk+bhil+bhik+bhij+bgkl+bgjk+bgil+bgik+
bgij+bghl+bghk+bghj+bghi+bfkl+bfjk+bfil+bfik+bfij+bfhl+bfhk+bfhj+bfhi+bfgl+bfgk+
bfgj+bfgi+bfgh+bekl+bejk+beil+beik+beij+behl+behk+behj+behi+begl+begk+begj+begi+
begh+befl+befk+befj+befi+befh+befg+bdjl+ajkl+aijl+ahkl+ahjl+ahjk+ahil+ahij+agkl+
agjl+agjk+agil+agij+aghl+aghk+aghj+aghi+afkl+afjl+afjk+afil+afij+afhl+afhk+afhj+
afhi+afgl+afgk+afgj+afgi+afgh+aekl+aejl+aejk+aeil+aeij+aehl+aehk+aehj+aehi+aegl+
aegk+aegj+aegi+aegh+aefl+aefk+aefj+aefi+aefh+aefg+acik+ghjkl+ghikl+ghijl+ghijk+
fhjkl+fhikl+fhijl+fhijk+fgjkl+fgikl+fgijl+fgijk+fghjl+fghik+ehjkl+ehikl+ehijl+ehijk+
egjkl+egikl+egijl+egijk+eghjl+eghik+efjkl+efikl+efijl+efijk+efhjl+efhik+efgjl+efgik+
dhikl+dhijk+dgikl+dgijk+dghkl+dghjk+dghil+dghik+dghij+dfikl+dfijk+dfhkl+dfhjk+dfhil+
dfhik+dfhij+dfgkl+dfgjk+dfgil+dfgik+dfgij+dfghl+dfghk+dfghj+dfghi+deikl+deijk+dehkl+
dehjk+dehil+dehik+dehij+degkl+degjk+degil+degik+degij+deghl+deghk+deghj+deghi+defkl+
defjk+defil+defik+defij+defhl+defhk+defhj+defhi+defgl+defgk+defgj+defgi+defgh+
chjkl+chijl+cgjkl+cgijl+cghkl+cghjl+cghjk+cghil+cghij+cfjkl+cfijl+cfhkl+cfhjl+cfhjk+
cfhil+cfhij+cfgkl+cfgjl+cfgjk+cfgil+cfgij+cfghl+cfghk+cfghj+cfghi+cejkl+ceijl+cehkl+
cehjl+cehjk+cehil+cehij+cegkl+cegjl+cegjk+cegil+cegij+ceghl+ceghk+ceghj+ceghi+cefkl+
cefjl+cefjk+cefil+cefij+cefhl+cefhk+cefhj+cefhi+cefgl+cefgk+cefgj+cefgi+cefgh+bhikl+
bhijk+bgikl+bgijk+bghkl+bghjk+bghil+bghik+bghij+bfikl+bfijk+bfhkl+bfhjk+bfhil+bfhik+
bfhij+bfgkl+bfgjk+bfgil+bfgik+bfgij+bfghl+bfghk+bfghj+bfghi+beikl+beijk+behkl+behjk+
behil+behik+behij+begkl+begjk+begil+begik+begij+beghl+beghk+beghj+beghi+befkl+befjk+
befil+befik+befij+befhl+befhk+befhj+befhi+befgl+befgk+befgj+befgi+befgh+bdjkl+bdijl+
bdhjl+bdgjl+bdfjl+bdejl+ahjkl+ahijl+agjkl+agijl+aghkl+aghjl+aghjk+aghil+aghij+afjkl+
afijl+afhkl+afhjl+afhjk+afhil+afhij+afgkl+afgjl+afgjk+afgil+afgij+afghl+afghk+
afghj+afghi+aejkl+aeijl+aehkl+aehjl+aehjk+aehil+aehij+aegkl+aegjl+aegjk+aegil+aegij+
aeghl+aeghk+aeghj+aeghi+aefkl+aefjl+aefjk+aefil+aefij+aefhl+aefhk+aefhj+aefhi+
aefgl+aefgk+aefgj+aefgi+aefgh+acikl+acijk+achik+acgik+acfik+aceik+fghjkl+fghikl+
fghijl+fghijk+eghjkl+eghikl+eghijl+eghijk+efhjkl+efhikl+efhijl+efhijk+efgjkl+efgikl+
efgijl+efgijk+efghjl+efghik+dghikl+dghijk+dfhikl+dfhijk+dfgikl+dfgijk+dfghkl+dfghjk+
dfghil+dfghik+dfghij+dehikl+dehijk+degikl+degijk+deghkl+deghjk+deghil+deghik+deghij+
defikl+ defijk+ defhkl+ defhjk+ defhil+ defhik+ defhij + defgkl+ defgjk+ defgil+ defgik +
defgij+defghl+defghk+defghj+defghi+cghjkl+cghijl+cfhjkl+cfhijl+cfgjkl+cfgijl+cfghkl+
cfghjl+cfghjk+cfghil+cfghij+cehjkl+cehijl+cegjkl+cegijl+ceghkl+ceghjl+ceghjk+ceghil+
ceghij+cefjkl+cefijl+cefhkl+cefhjl+cefhjk+cefhil+cefhij+cefgkl+cefgjl+cefgjk+cefgil+
cefgij+cefghl+cefghk+cefghj+cefghi+bghikl+bghijk+bfhikl+bfhijk+bfgikl+bfgijk+bfghkl+
bfghjk+bfghil+bfghik+bfghij+behikl+behijk+begikl+begijk+beghkl+beghjk+beghil+beghik+
beghij+befikl+befijk+befhkl+befhjk+befhil+befhik+befhij+befgkl+befgjk+befgil+befgik+
befgij+befghl+befghk+befghj+befghi+bdijkl+bdhjkl+bdhijl+bdgjkl+bdgijl+bdghjl+bdfjkl+
bdfijl+ bdfhjl+ bdfgjl+ bdejkl+ bdeijl+ bdehjl+ bdegjl+ bdefjl+aghjkl+aghijl+afhjkl+afhijl+
afgjkl+afgijl+afghkl+afghjl+afghjk+afghil+afghij+aehjkl+aehijl+aegjkl+aegijl+aeghkl+
aeghjl+aeghjk+aeghil+aeghij+aefjkl+aefijl+aefhkl+aefhjl+aefhjk+aefhil+aefhij+aefgkl+
aefgjl+aefgjk+aefgil+aefgij+aefghl+aefghk+aefghj+aefghi+acijkl+achikl+achijk+acgikl+
acgijk+acghik+acfikl+acfijk+acfhik+acfgik+aceikl+aceijk+acehik+acegik+acefik+efghjkl+
efghikl+ efghijl+ efghijk + dfghikl+ dfghijk + deghikl+ deghijk + defhikl+ defhijk + defgikl+
defgijk+ defghkl+ defghjk+ defghil+ defghik+ defghij + cfghjkl+ cfghijl+ ceghjkl+ ceghijl+
cefhjkl + cefhijl + cefgjkl + cefgijl + cefghkl + cefghjl + cefghjk + cefghil + cefghij + bfghikl +
bfghijk + beghikl+ beghijk + befhikl+ befhijk + befgikl+ befgijk + befghkl+ befghjk + befghil+
befghik+befghij+bdhijkl+bdgijkl+bdghjkl+bdghijl+bdfijkl+bdfhjkl+bdfhijl+bdfgjkl+bdfgijl+
bdfghjl+bdeijkl+bdehjkl+bdehijl+bdegjkl+bdegijl+bdeghjl+bdefjkl+bdefijl+bdefhjl+bdefgjl+
afghjkl+ afghijl+ aeghjkl+ aeghijl+ aefhjkl+ aefhijl+ aefgjkl+ aefgijl+ aefghkl+ aefghjl+
aefghjk + aefghil+ aefghij + achijkl+ acgijkl+ acghikl+ acghijk + acfijkl+ acfhikl+ acfhijk +
acfgikl+acfgijk+acfghik+aceijkl+acehikl+acehijk+acegikl+acegijk+aceghik+acefikl+acefijk+
acefhik + acefgik + defghikl + defghijk + cefghjkl + cefghijl + befghikl + befghijk + bdghijkl +
bdfhijkl+bdfgijkl+bdfghjkl+bdfghijl+bdehijkl+bdegijkl+bdeghjkl+bdeghijl+bdefijkl+bdefhjkl+
bdefhijl + bdefgjkl + bdefgijl + bdefghjl + aefghjkl + aefghijl + acghijkl + acfhijkl + acfgijkl +
acfghikl + acfghijk + acehijkl + acegijkl + aceghikl + aceghijk + acefijkl + acefhikl + acefhijk +
acefgikl+acefgijk+acefghik+bdfghijkl+bdeghijkl+bdefhijkl+bdefgijkl+bdefghjkl+bdefghijl+
acfghijkl + aceghijkl + acefhijkl + acefgijkl + acefghikl + acefghijk + bdefghijkl + acefghijkl
Appendix E
Github Project weak keys
The scripts used for this thesis can be found in https://github.com/mariosgeorgiou17uclacuk/
weak_keys
E.1 Walsh Spectrum and Autocorrelation Spectrum
We use Python3 to compute the Walsh Spectrum and Autocorrelation Spectrum. By executing
the commands below, we can compute the Walsh and Autocorrelation Spectrum for the Boolean
function of T-310:
pip install itertools
pip install numpy
pip install scipy
We then run the python script by:
python spectrum.py
The results will be printed on the screen.
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E.2 Invariants on 12 bits
In order to compute all invariants on 12 bits we need first to create a text file, we name it
’IOquestion12.txt’, of this format:
Figure E.1: IOquestion12.txt
We use Python3 and Sagemath 8.0, so before running the files we need to execute the commands
below:
pip install itertools
pip install sys
pip install compiler
Step 1: We run mongen.py by:
python mongen.py IOquestion12.txt
which takes as input the text file ’IOquestion12.txt’, and it will create two separate text files,
called ’draft1.txt’ and ’draft2.txt’. ’draft1.txt’ contains all possible monomials for the variables
{a, b, c, . . . , k, l} and ’draft2.txt’ contains all the resulting polynomials after one round, for each
possible monomial in ’draft1.txt’.
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Step 2: We then run mongen.ipynb, a Sagemath file, which calculates all resulting polynomials
by removing the parentheses from ’draft2.txt’. It will then create a text file, called
’IOquestion12.all monomials.txt’, which contains two columns of data. The first column con-
tains all the possible monomials from ’draft1.txt’ and the second column contains the corre-
sponding polynomials after one round.
Step 3: When the new text file is created, we run ax64.exe as follows:
ax64.exe 41012 "IOmonomials.temp.txt" "IOquestion12.all_monomials.txt"
to create a text file, called ”IOmonomials.temp.txt”, which contains the XOR of the two
columns.
Step 4: As soon as ”IOmonomials.temp.txt” is created, we run replacebooleanfunction.ipynb,
a Sagemath file, which will substitute F,L and Z, do the calculations for each polynomial and
write the result in the text file called ’IOmonomials.temp2.txt’.
Step 5: Finally, we use ax64.exe again by executing the command below:
ax64.exe 41013 "IOmonomials.temp.rewritten.txt" "IOmonomials.temp2.txt"
A text file, called ’Kernel abcd.txt’ will be created, which will contain all the invariants for the
specific long term key.
